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New forms of inter-agency co-operation have gained increasing prominence in the
development and delivery of activation strategies. This article compares different models
of inter-agency co-operation, drawing on case study research inDenmark, theNetherlands
and the UK. The different models have reported variations in performance when delivering
on the key beneﬁts often attributed to effective inter-agency co-operation. The article
raises concerns that the process of contracting-out in activation has at times conﬂicted
with attempts to improve co-operation between agencies, while the increasing dominance
of purchaser–provider relations can undermine progress towards ‘shared ownership’ of
activation policies and effective partnership-working.
I n t roduct ion and methodo logy
I n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on and ac t i v a t i on
New forms of inter-agency co-operation have gained increasing prominence in the
development and delivery of activation strategies. Successive formulations of the European
Employment Strategy have called for local partnership-working as a means of ensuring
responsive activation services, while arguing for the ‘progressive de-monopolisation’ of
interventions once dominated by Public Employment Services (PES) (Lindsay, 2007).
More generally, the concept of inter-agency co-operation, and specifically partnership, in
service delivery emerged during the 1980s and 1990s as a canon of public policy and
private enterprise (Knox, 2002). While there are a multitude of definitions of partnership,
the OECD (1990: 18) has suggested that the term can be deployed to cover a broad
range of: ‘Systems of formalised co-operation, grounded in legally binding arrangements
or informal understandings, co-operative working relationships, and mutually adopted
plans among a number of institutions.’
Such broad-based definitions tend to assume that the concept of partnership can
usefully encapsulate both systemic co-ordination (embedded multi-agency governance
based on a shared vision and institutionalised joint-working) and principal-agent relations,
which may include competitive tendering models favoured under the contracting-out of
public services (Stoker, 1998). Some dispute the inclusion of principal-agent contracting
as a form of partnership, arguing that trust is a key feature of the kind of ‘networked
governance’ that defines genuine partnership-working, and that contracting refers to a
different form of relationship (Powell and Exworthy, 2002). But it has also been noted that,
rather than simply seeking to impose private sector inputs, policy makers drawn towards
contracting-out often seek similar benefits to those attributed to partnership-based forms
of inter-agency co-operation. There is an acknowledgment among these policy makers of
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the multi-dimensional nature of the disadvantage experienced by excluded groups, and
that multi-agency solutions are required to assist them (Stoker, 1998; McQuaid, 2000).
Nevertheless, a fundamental issue relates to the extent to which contracting-out
can be seen as a necessary feature of effective partnerships, or as even compatible
with such collaborative forms of inter-agency co-operation. There is evidence that
partnership-working and contracting-out are not always mutually exclusive (Rummery,
2002), but a key question for our research focused on the compatibility of planning and
implementation partnerships (characterised by the sharing of resources and decision-
making) with contractual models of delivery defined in terms of ‘payment by results’.
As we note below, while partnership-working and contracting-out have co-existed in
our case study countries, policy makers have often struggled to reconcile these different
approaches to promoting inter-agency co-operation.
Mapp ing po ten t i a l benefi t s and l im i t a t i ons o f i n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on
This article discusses different models of inter-agency co-operation in the governance
and delivery of activation, focusing on three leading ‘active’ welfare states: Denmark,
the Netherlands and the UK. We seek to identify common and divergent trends in the
localisation and contracting-out of services; explore how effectively different models
have been able to tap the key benefits attributed to effective inter-agency co-operation;
and identify the limits on co-operation that are inherent within different governance and
delivery arrangements.
There is a substantial literature on the potential ‘partnership benefits’ associated with
effective inter-agency co-operation in all its forms. For the purposes of the discussion
below, we focus on six key benefits of effective partnerships consistently raised in the
literature (see McQuaid, 2000; Nelson and Zadek, 2000; Dowling et al., 2004; McQuaid
et al., 2005 for a review of research).
• Local ﬂexibility and responsiveness. Given the complexity of the issue of social and
labour market exclusion, and its sensitivity to local economic conditions, it is suggested
that multi-agency approaches grounded in local labour markets are necessary to
facilitate the tailoring of interventions to specific local circumstances.
• Sharing knowledge, expertise and resources. Bringing together a range of stakeholders
with different areas of expertise can offer opportunities to share practice and
information, while the ‘local knowledge’ of community-level stakeholders can be
invaluable in developing solutions targeted at the specific needs of disadvantaged
areas or groups. Partnerships can also add to the total level of resources available by
increasing the number of budget-holding organisations involved.
• Improving efﬁciency. Advocates of partnership-based approaches suggest that the
synergies available from close co-operation (whereby information sharing and
improved communication results in smoother service interactions and the avoidance
of duplication of effort) improves overall efficiency.
• Developing joined-up services. During the policy planning phase, strategic level
partnerships can ensure that initiatives across areas of government activity are aligned
to achieve a coherent, integrated and long-term approach. Closer collaboration
between agencies often aims at providing a consistent level of service and a convenient,
‘one stop’ environment for service users.
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• Capacity building. Multi-agency partnerships can build community capacity and
engender a sense of ‘shared ownership’ at the local level. In countries such as the
UK, the voluntary sector and local community organisations have increasingly found
themselves called upon to assist in the delivery of government-funded activation. For
these stakeholders, co-operation with government offers new opportunities to have a
practical impact on the policy agenda, while also providing access to long-term, stable
funding.
• Gaining legitimisation and ‘buy-in’. Governments have long been aware that
engagement of non-governmental stakeholders can provide legitimisation, and the
mobilisation of political support, for new policy goals. During the delivery phase
of initiatives, the engagement of community-level stakeholders can similarly add
to the credibility of interventions. As we will see below, where governments have
demonstrated a willingness to share a degree of decision-making authority with other
agencies, these stakeholders are more likely to ‘buy-in’ to the process, and commit
themselves to making interventions work.
The extent to which different models of inter-agency co-operation on activation have
been able to deliver these benefits provides the focus for the discussion below. However,
it is worth noting at this early stage the inherent limits to co-operation. Where attempts
have been made to build locally responsive, multi-agency solutions, effective inter-agency
co-operation can be undermined by the rigidity of institutional and policy structures;
where partnerships are advocated as a means of building capacity in the voluntary sector,
community organisations can find their independence undermined. Finally, where multi-
agency solutions are based on contracting-out, the benefits associated with the purchase
of more specialist provision can be undermined by problems associated with transaction
costs and the subordination of quality to financial concerns.
Methodo logy
Our discussion draws on case study research conducted in the three countries. In each
case, the research involved case study visits to organisations involved in the governance
and delivery of activation at the local and regional and/or national levels. Specifically,
stakeholders in each country consulted for the research were as follows:
• Denmark: the government’s national Labour Market Authority; national and regional
Trades Union Congress representatives; national and regional representatives of the
main employers’ federation (‘Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening’); PES managers based in the
‘Greater Copenhagen’ region; and a community-level activation provider delivering
provision for job seekers in inner-city Copenhagen (7 in-depth interviews).
• The Netherlands: the government Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment; national
and regional PES managers; national and regional managers at the Administrative
Agency for Employees’ Insurance (UWV); the national representative body for local
authority social services department managers (DIVOSA); a local authority manager in
the city of Rotterdam; and a major, Rotterdam-based private sector activation provider
(9 in-depth interviews).
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• The UK: regional PES managers; policy officers within the devolved governments of
Scotland and Northern Ireland; health service managers and staff involved in the
‘Pathways to Work’ programme in two regions; community-level activation providers
delivering provision for job seekers in the cities of Edinburgh and Belfast; and a
major private sector activation provider based in the city of Birmingham (15 in-depth
interviews).
In each country, interviewees were selected in order to gain insights into the most
important and/or most innovative forms of inter-agency working within the activation
policy agenda. Accordingly, government, PES and social partner representatives with
an insight into the reform of Denmark’s distinctive regional partnership structures were
targeted. In the Netherlands, recent jobcentre developments have required co-operation
across the PES, the unemployment insurance administration and local authorities,
and private sector contractors – representatives of these stakeholders were therefore
interviewed. In the UK, interviews were carried out with PES officers who oversee
contracting-out and private, public and community sector providers involved in delivering
PES-funded provision under both contractual arrangements and partnership-based pilot
models.
Denmark : f rom reg iona l par tnersh ips to jo ined-up loca l se rv ices
I n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on i n Denmark
Denmark has been consistently highlighted as a key ‘active’ welfare state in Europe, with
successive governments overseeing a series of reforms to convert the country’s once largely
passive welfare state into a leading exponent of activation strategies. Despite its relatively
recent emergence, with many elements of the current system introduced since 1994,
the Danish approach to activation has reflected a combination of long-standing policy
traditions: a strong, centralised state-led approach to the development of policy, typical
of many ‘social democratic’ welfare states in Nordic Europe; and an active role for social
partnership and, more recently, local government in the planning and implementation of
policy.
From 1994 to 2006, Regional Labour Market Councils (RARs), with membership
from social partner (employer and trade union) organisations and local authorities
played an important role in agreeing activation targets and programme content for
the insured unemployed in 14 PES regions.1 The 2007 re-organisation of local and
regional government in Denmark saw major changes to the governance of activation. Four
new ‘state-region’-level Employment Councils replaced RARs. PES and local authority-
led service centres were amalgamated within 91 one-stop-shop jobcentres. However,
the decision-making authority and influence enjoyed by RARs have been lost. The
targeting and resourcing of activation are now the remit of PES and local authorities
alone, based on agreements reached with the government Labour Market Authority
(LMA). Finally, the period since 1994 has seen a gradual increase in the importance
of contractual relationships with external service providers. By 2005, there were 159
recognised activation providers nationally, two-thirds of which were private companies,
with the remainder trade union or unemployment insurance fund organisations and further
education institutions.
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Benefi t s and l im i t a t i ons o f i n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on
One of the main advantages associated with the regional structures that operated in
Denmark from 1994 to 2006 appears to have been that – within clear, centrally defined
parameters – key stakeholders were able to discuss and agree targeted local responses.
RARs operating at the city-regional level delivered a degree of the local ﬂexibility
and responsiveness that marks successful planning partnerships. A government LMA
representative noted the importance of ‘giving concrete decision-making authority to
the regions’ (in relation to the content and target groups for some interventions) in order
to develop flexible solutions. Greater Copenhagen RAR members gave a number of
examples of this flexibility in action, including the targeting of resources towards the needs
of minority ethnic and immigrant job seekers (a much larger client group in Copenhagen
than in any other part of Denmark).
Regional and national stakeholders were divided as to whether the process of
localisation implemented from 2007 would improve the responsiveness of services. PES
and municipality officials shared the view that a more locally responsive set of policy
initiatives could emerge. However, some trade union and employer representatives were
concerned about the limited capacity within smaller local authorities. There was also
scepticism regarding the impact of contracting-out. The use of a broader range of external
providers has been justified as providing a route to more responsive, flexible interventions,
but trade union representatives and even some PES managers noted that progress in this
area had been variable and limited.
Stakeholders noted the value of RAR structures in sharing knowledge, expertise
and resources, bringing together the PES, employers’ representatives, trade unions and
local authorities. There was concern that the shift towards a localised jobcentre model
threatened progress in this area. Accordingly, PES and trades union and employers’
representatives highlighted the importance of ‘securing knowledge’ during the process
of reform. This was considered important given the shift towards local authority-level
provision and the resulting dispersal of some PES officers (and their expertise) from
regional to local centres.
Evidence on the impact of former regional and new local governance structures in
improving efﬁciency was less clear. PES managers and employers’ representatives argued
that RAR processes had often been time-consuming (although there was a sense among
even these stakeholders that the bureaucracy associated with RARs was justified by
the sense of shared accountability and ‘ownership’ that emerged from joint decision-
making). Government LMA representatives argued that contracting-out had the potential
to deliver increased efficiency, a view shared by some employers’ representatives, but
other stakeholders were unconvinced. Trade union representatives suggested that a focus
on the mechanics of marketisation had often obscured the lack of clear evidence (as yet)
of improved services.
There was optimism regarding the potential impact of new localised jobcentres in
delivering a more efficient ‘one string’ system for job seekers, and in general the reform was
seen as offering the opportunity for developing joined-up services. The shift towards a job-
centre model that would allow learning and practice-sharing between PES and local au-
thorities was also seen by all stakeholders as a means of promoting local capacity building.
Perhaps the most consistently raised concern regarding the process of localisation
referred to the manner in which RARs had been effective at gaining legitimisation and
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‘buy-in’, and the danger that progress in this area would be undermined by the abolition of
regional planning structures. A number of stakeholders noted the value of RAR structures
in gaining the support of key interest groups, such as trade unions and employers. For a
government LMA representative, the legitimacy provided by the active involvement of a
key employers’ association had made it easier to engage business (crucial to the successful
operation of wage subsidy programmes). Similarly, it was suggested that the role of trade
unions in regional planning had helped to legitimise compulsory programmes in the eyes
of the unemployed.
Crucially, it was acknowledged that the genuine (if limited) shared authority and
decision-making power within the RAR model had promoted a sense of ownership among
partner organisations. By ceding and sharing some responsibility for the planning, funding
and targeting of activation with employers and trades union organisations (as well as
local authorities), the then Danish government ensured that these organisations had a
stake in, and sense of responsibility for, seeing that programmes worked. The local and
regional advisory councils that have replaced RARs deny social partners a proactive role
in the planning and development of activation, potentially undermining the sense of
commitment among employers and trade unionists.
The Nether lands : ho l low ing out the PES , cont rac t ing-ou t ac t i va t ion
I n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on i n The Ne the r l ands
The Netherlands’ labour market policy institutions have experienced a process of rapid
and almost constant reform since the 1980s. Tripartite institutions that gave social partners
an important role in the administration of insurance-based benefits, and latterly the
management of the PES, were introduced and then dissolved. A process of marketisation
starting in the 1990s saw insurance fund organisations and local authorities (dealing with
unemployment insurance and income-based benefit claimants respectively) required to
purchase activation services in a new market, which was initially dominated by the PES
(Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007).
More recently, the 2002 ‘SUWI’ Act (meaning ‘implementation structure for work and
income’) established the UWV – functioning under the control of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment – as the single management body for benefits and activation for
the insured unemployed. Local authorities remained in charge of social assistance benefits
and services. Successive reforms to funding mechanisms have granted each municipality
a greater degree of autonomy over the delivery of activation, but also total financial and
budgetary responsibility.
A series of reforms has also resulted in the privatisation of those areas of PES activity
involving the delivery of intensive activation. The role of the PES (known as Centre for
Work and Income – CWI) is now largely limited to ‘gate-keeping’ – assessing clients
and providing job matching services for the least disadvantaged. The UWV and local
authorities are the main funders/purchasers of activation services, while the government
has insisted that 70% services purchased by the UWV (and, until recently, the majority
of those purchased by local authorities) are delivered by private sector organisations. At
the same time, integrated local jobcentres (CWI’s) have been established, co-locating staff
from the PES, and the two types of funder/purchaser organisations.
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Benefi t s and l im i t a t i ons o f i n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on
Key stakeholders interviewed for our research were committed to the Centres for Work
and Income approach, and strongly advocated the continued co-location and integration
of services as a route to increased local ﬂexibility and responsiveness in services. National
government officials pointed to the benefits for clients in being able to access both benefits
advice and job search services from expert organisations at the same location.
Ministers have expressed the hope that the outsourcing of activation will also
contribute to the development of more individually tailored, locally responsive services.
But government officials and local stakeholders acknowledged that progress towards
more responsive, flexible provision has been slow. Indeed, representatives of both local
authorities and the UWV accepted that the pressure of competing on cost had driven many
private sector providers to seek economies of scale through standardised approaches. It
should, however, be acknowledged that both key funders – the UWV and local authorities
– remained optimistic that a more flexible approach would soon emerge with the roll-
out of ‘Individual Reintegration Accounts’ and ‘Personal Reintegration Budgets’. These
funding arrangements have been used to provide a modular, voucher-type system designed
to allow the activation client a wider range of choice in activation.
All local and regional stakeholders also valued the Centres for Work and Income
model as a means of sharing knowledge, expertise and resources. It was suggested that
the co-location of different organisations in Centres for Work and Income has helped to
foster improved joint-working and communication, and a better understanding of each
agency’s procedures and roles. Nevertheless, PES managers acknowledged that they were
not ‘equal partners’ in deciding clients’ trajectories, and activation funders were even less
convinced of their influence.
In more general terms, the contractual relations that are at the heart of the manage-
ment of activation in the Netherlands may also act as a barrier to genuine partnership work-
ing. Private sector providers have a key role in delivering services on the ground and can
therefore offer valuable insights as to ‘what works’, but the unequal power that defines con-
tracting may inherently limit their ability to influence funders. A UWV manager dismissed
the idea that contracted providers could be seen as partners in assessing the best activation
trajectory for clients: ‘There is certainly no partnership. It’s a contractual relationship. We
have discussions, and companies make presentations about what they can offer.’
The Centres for Work and Income approach was viewed as contributing to improving
efﬁciency. Improved communication and information sharing was seen as reducing errors,
misunderstandings and paperwork at the operational level. Most regional and national
stakeholders agreed that it was ‘too early to tell’ if contracting-out had produced the
desired efficiencies. All the relevant stakeholders acknowledged some problems around
transaction costs and new bureaucracy. Despite these problems, national and local
government interviewees shared the view that setting clear budgets and targets for private
providers had the potential to improve performance. A local authority representative
argued that contracting-out had resulted in a stronger sense of control, contrasting
current arrangements with some previous municipality-delivered activation programmes
that were ‘governed by their own logic’, ‘reversed normal economic principles and . . .
operated for their own sake’.
There was agreement that the greatest value of Centres for Work and Income was
their contribution to developing joined-up services and presenting unemployed clients
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with a ‘one stop shop’. National and regional stakeholders similarly highlighted the value
delivered by Centres for Work and Income in relation to capacity building. UWV and
local authorities’ representatives saw the Centres as offering an opportunity for PES staff
to learn about benefits regulation and activation options. However, for one regional
PES manager, additional measures to build professional capacity among local authorities
remained necessary. It was suggested that the switch to a market-based approach in which
virtually all activation services have been contracted-out has left local authorities with
few professionals with direct experience of dealing with clients’ problems (and limited
experience in purchasing and managing privatised services).
This highlights a broader concern with the Dutch model. Much of the expertise
formerly held by the PES has now been transferred to the private sector (with PES
professionals largely limited to registering clients and facilitating job search for the most
able), while key public purchasers have limited direct contact with clients. Accordingly,
there is a danger that the public sector will suffer a loss of crucial ‘intellectual capital’ –
the institutionalised knowledge of ‘what’s needed’ and ‘what works’ that only comes from
direct engagement with clients and service providers on the ground. The marginalisation
of the role of the PES may also have implications for the consistency of services, in turn
impacting on the ability of delivery agencies in different localities to gain legitimisation
and ‘buy-in’ for activation.
The UK: ‘Cent ra l i sed loca l i sm’ and the re t rea t f rom par tnersh ip
I n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on i n the UK
The Labour government elected in the UK in 1997 has consistently deployed the language
of partnership in relation to its reform of the governance and delivery of activation (Lindsay,
2007). The New Deal – the UK’s main group of compulsory activation programmes
established between 1997 and 2000 – was initially designed and implemented at the
local level through ‘New Deal Partnerships’, led by the PES, but including a range of
public, private and voluntary sector actors. However, local experimentation soon gave
way to a standardised approach, with the PES assuming the sole lead role in most areas.
New Deal Partnerships have now disappeared. The standard UK approach to activation
instead involves a strong role for the PES in directly delivering job matching and basic
counselling (‘Personal Adviser’) services under programmes such as New Deal, and
managing contracts with external providers who carry out more specialist interventions.2
Although models of contracting are fairly rigid, a range of public, private and voluntary
sector providers are involved in delivery.
With the expansion of the UK’s activation agenda a familiar pattern has emerged,
where flexible funding arrangements and partnership-based governance are relied
upon to test new, experimental interventions during their ‘pilot’ phase, but centralised
contractualism (often governed by rigid, job outcome-driven reward systems) are imposed
when programmes are rolled out nationally. For example, ‘Employment Zones’, operating
in areas of high unemployment since 1998, initially sought to experiment with flexible
funding mechanisms, with resources allocated following consultation between the PES
(the funder) and other local stakeholders. The roll-out of the programme nationally has
seen a more standardised form of contracting-out between the PES and private ‘lead part-
ners’, which then often sub-contract aspects of delivery to other agencies (Bruttel, 2005).
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Similarly, the piloting of ‘Pathways to Work’ (which seeks to activate those claiming
health-related incapacity benefits, and which provided a particular focus for our research)
has involved a highly flexible funding model, with the PES sharing responsibility for the
development and management of a ‘Condition Management Programme’ with public
National Health Service (NHS) managers. Flexible funding structures allowed NHS
managers considerable freedom in recruitment of staff and resourcing of programme
development (Lindsay et al., 2007). However, government promises that in ‘future
Pathways to Work provision will be delivered primarily by the private and voluntary
sectors, with payment by results’ (HM Treasury, 2006: 43) suggest that the partnership-
based approach that defined the pilot phase of the programme is again in danger. In
general terms, the UK model has been characterised as a form of ‘centralised localism’
(Lødemel, 2001), with the PES largely controlling the design and content of programmes,
and local ‘partners’ tendering to provide pre-agreed services within a set contracting
structure, rather than contributing to the planning of flexible solutions on equal terms.
Benefi t s and l im i t a t i ons o f i n t e r- agency co-ope ra t i on
Despite long-standing concerns regarding the UK model’s reliance on centralised
contractualism, regional PES managers and other key stakeholders argued that there
remained the capacity for a range of providers to be contracted to deliver tailored
services, ensuring some local ﬂexibility and responsiveness. It was suggested that the
‘opening up’ of the delivery of activation to include the private and voluntary sectors
(produced by the first wave of New Deal reforms) has generally had a positive impact
on the diversity of provision available, while contributing to capacity building, especially
among voluntary organisations. Where pilot programmes have allowed for more flexible
relationships between the PES and other stakeholders, such as under Pathways to Work,
there have been further opportunities for capacity building – in this case PES advisers
and NHS health professionals were able to work with clients together, learning from each
other’s experience and expertise.
All PES managers agreed that the inclusion of a broader range of providers had
facilitated the sharing of knowledge and expertise, although it was acknowledged that
resource-sharing under programmes such as New Deal was subject to contractual
arrangements clearly articulating the outcomes required by the PES as funder. Among
other stakeholders (for example, local authority managers involved in the development of
complementary activation initiatives) there was frustration that the PES’s role as purchaser
of services precluded a fuller engagement and information-sharing with local public and
voluntary sector providers.
PES managers were convinced that clearly defined contractual arrangements were
essential to improving efﬁciency (although there was an openness to contracting with
public and voluntary organisations, as well as the private sector). Other stakeholders
were less convinced that contracting-out had delivered improved efficiency. Indeed, in
the case of Pathways to Work, there appeared to be substantial efficiencies associated with
the more flexible form of partnership-working established during the programme’s pilot
phase. The engagement of the NHS as a partner allowed for economies of scale provided
by access to the organisation’s networks of expertise, facilities and support services.
Finally, the inclusion of a broad range of contracted providers has arguably added
value in delivering a degree of legitimisation and ‘buy in’. As noted above, a strength of
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the UK model of contracting is its openness to working with providers in the public sector
(including local authorities) and specialist voluntary and community-based organisations.
PES managers and other key stakeholders acknowledged that the inclusion of expert
delivery agencies (especially those with an established reputation for working in local
communities) added to the perceived legitimacy of activation among job seekers. The
recently developed Pathways to Work again offers valuable lessons. Previous attempts to
activate claimants of incapacity benefits have generated hostility among many, but both
PES and NHS staff involved in Pathways to Work suggested that the participation of health
professionals had reassured clients that the programme was a credible service with the
capacity to improve their health (as well as their employability).
However, a recent shift towards private sector-led, contracted-out approaches under
Pathways to Work could put at risk partnership-based governance developed during the
programme’s pilot phase. Pathways to Work appears to be about to fall victim to a familiar
process in UK employability policy making, whereby innovative strategies are developed
under flexible funding and partnership-based governance during piloting, only for policy
makers to sanction a retreat from partnership towards more rigid forms of managerialism
and contractualism as programmes are rolled out nationally.
Discuss ion and conc lus ions
EU member states are increasingly turning to inter-agency co-operation as a means of
planning and implementing activation. The results of the case study research discussed
above confirm a shared focus on local collaboration and the inclusion of a diverse range
of delivery agents. Both Denmark and the Netherlands have moved towards a localised,
integrated jobcentre model bringing together PES and local authorities’ services. In the
UK, local authorities tend to offer their own complementary employability services, but
are not integrated within jobcentres (reflecting the manner in which local government is
not responsible for administering social assistance in the UK), while the PES dominates
jobcentre services and activation programme development and contracting.
Locating new forms of inter-agency governance and delivery at an appropriate spatial
level has been a priority for policy makers in all the case study countries, with processes of
localisation often (but not always) seen as complementing and facilitating co-operation.
In all cases there are important potential benefits associated with the co-location and
closer integration of services – ‘one stop’ jobcentres provide more joined-up services
(including the welcome integration of provision for claimants of different benefits) and
should promote capacity building and the sharing of knowledge and expertise between
agencies. However, we have noted how differential power relationships have the potential
to undermine partnership-working (especially in cases such as the Netherlands, where
the PES’s lack of budget control limits its ability to influence activation trajectories). The
Danish experience also highlights how the shift towards localisation has the potential to
undermine effective existing partnership-working, which, in the case of RARs, saw the PES
share ownership of activation planning with social partners, ceding a degree of decision-
making authority to these stakeholders and thus ensuring a greater degree of legitimisation
and ‘buy in’ for interventions. There also remain questions about the capacity of local
authority-level stakeholders to manage activation and effectively co-ordinate activities
within and across regions.
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Furthermore, the experience of localisation and service integration in Denmark and
the Netherlands raises concerns about the capacity to ensure a consistent level of basic
services following the weakening of the role of the PES. In the Netherlands, the estab-
lishment of Centres for Work and Income and the contracting-out of previously PES-led
activation has left the organisation (like the local authorities and UWV that fund services)
with limited direct contact with more disadvantaged clients, resulting in a potential loss
of intellectual capital – the kind of institutionalised knowledge that only comes from
direct engagement in the delivery of services. In Denmark, the dismantling of regional
PES structures risks dispersing the expertise held within the organisation too thinly.
All three case study states have seen a more general trend towards the contracting-
out of activation. The stated aim is to increase the range of specialist, individualised
support available to clients, and improve the efficiency and responsiveness of delivery.
Yet in all cases there remain questions about the capacity of contractualism to deliver
the innovation and responsiveness sought from multi-agency approaches – the unequal
power between purchaser and provider limits the potential for sharing ideas; the short-
term nature of some contracts (as in the Netherlands) can undermine attempts to build
consistent, long-term interventions; the rigidity of certain forms of contracting (as in the
UK) can actively discourage partnership-working; and the process of marketisation in
itself can prevent specialisation, as providers seek efficiencies in the battle for limited
funding.
As noted above, in the case of the Netherlands, the large-scale contracting-out of
PES activities has also contributed to the hollowing out of this key public organisation,
threatening the consistency of services and leaving policy makers with limited sense of
connection to the practical issues around delivering services for job seekers on the ground.
The UK government’s interest in promoting private sector leadership in the delivery of
activation suggests that a similar process of hollowing out may be repeated here – a
recent government-supported review has argued for the large-scale contracting-out of
provision to private providers (Freud, 2007). Indeed, as the Pathways to Work programme
highlighted above has been rolled out nationally, there has already been a decisive shift
towards contracting-out, with private sector ‘lead providers’ now managing the majority
of provision (DWP, 2007). There is some evidence that this change has already limited the
ability of the PES to build upon pre-existing partnerships with NHS health organisations.
PES ‘Personal Advisers’ (who previously played a key role in delivering tailored services
for Pathways to Work clients) have also seen their advice work contracted-out in some
areas. Like PES officers in the Netherlands, these professionals have been limited to a
registration and job matching role – a shift that similarly threatens to undermine the
capacity of government to directly deliver (and therefore ensure the consistency and
quality of) more intensive support services.
Comparing trends across the three countries, it is clear that the Netherlands has gone
furthest towards a contractual model, but that the UK’s already extensive contracting-out of
specialist provision may soon lead to a similar outsourcing of PES-led intensive activation
and employment services. Denmark’s experiment with contracting-out has been more
gradual and halting, reflecting the lack of political consensus (and perhaps the weakness
of private sector capacity) in a country that has strong traditions of social partnership in
planning and public sector leadership in the delivery of services.
Genuine partnership-working requires the ceding of authority and sharing of
resources and responsibilities. Where implemented, such partnerships can deliver rewards
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in terms of enhanced knowledge sharing, improved efficiency and greater legitimacy for
activation through a sense of shared ownership (and therefore commitment to making
interventions work) among key stakeholders. Such shared ownership has proved difficult
to establish and maintain in all three of these vanguard active welfare states. Specifically,
it remains unclear if an increasing reliance on the contracting-out of PES functions
(especially in the UK and the Netherlands), and the unequal distribution of power
and resources implied by such arrangements, can be fully reconciled with partnership-
working. Yet effective inter-agency co-operation in the governance and delivery of
activation remains most likely within partnerships where strong PES organisations retain
a key role in the management and (if appropriate) delivery of services, but are also
empowered to share resources and decision-making authority with other stakeholders.
Notes
1 From 1998, Local Co-ordination Committees advised municipalities’ development of policies for
social assistance claimants, but lacked the power of RARs to influence the use of budgets and target
services on specific client groups.
2 The administration of both insurance-based and social assistance benefits has been the
responsibility of a single PES organisation, Jobcentre Plus, since 2002. Services for claimants of insurance-
based and social assistance benefits are fully integrated in the UK. Local authorities play no role in the
delivery of basic benefits and services for job seekers, but can deliver activation programmes (in some
cases as a PES-contracted provider).
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